Article 301 and Turkish Stability by White, Elizabeth
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the
European Union
Volume 2007 Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research
Conference on the European Union Article 12
February 2012
Article 301 and Turkish Stability
Elizabeth White
University of California, Santa Barbara
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Eastern European Studies Commons, and
the International Relations Commons
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more
information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
White, Elizabeth (2007) "Article 301 and Turkish Stability," Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union:
Vol. 2007, Article 12. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.200701.12
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/12
C1aremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 127 
10 
ARTICLE 301 AND TURKISH STABILITY 
Elizabeth V. White 
I NTRODUCTION 
Since the fall of 2005, more than sixty j o urnalists, academics, intellectuals and even 
fi ction writers have been subj ect to a rash of charges of "insulting Turkishness" under Article 
301 of the Turkish Penal Code. This phenom enon reinforces at the same time it restricts the 
development of free speech in Turkey at the cusp of a society precariously balanced between 
EU accession and ultra-nationalist isolationism . 
Turkey cannot become a m ember of the European Union unti l it reconciles its need 
to control the actions and words of its populous with its desire to reform and integrate. T he 
following pages are intended to show that the divided and tumultuous political landscape 
builds blockades on the road to E U accession as fas t as they can be knocked down . Turkey 
is simultaneously m aking progress and getting nowhere due in part to a fundam ental lack 
of internal cohesio n with rega rds to the requirem ents and ramificatio ns of free speech as 
defined by the standards of the EU. 
Turkey's executive branch is at odds with its judicial branch and ultra-nationalist 
lawyers and does no t seem entirely comfortable with the suppression of the press. H owever, 
due to a surge in ultra-nationalist voter support fo r certain judicial decisions, the current 
AKP controlled government has yet to find a politically sound way to address the matter. 
M embers of Turkey's free press are repeatedly brought up on charges which are then 
m arginalized on case by case basis, indicating an aversion to dealing with Article 301 
directl y. Article 301 and the issue of free speech is a deeply polarized issue in Turkey and 
many Turkish political pundits opine that a strong stance one way or the other on Article 
301 will not be presented by the AK party until after the coming elections. 
ARTICLE 301 
Article 30 1 took effect on June 1, 2005, part of a package of penal-law reforms 
introduced to bring Turkey up to European Union standards and as a precursor to EU 
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accession negotiations. Article 301 covers the following: 
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisomnent of between 
six months and three years. 
2.A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, 
the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security organizations shall 
be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years. 
3 . In cases where denigration of Turkish ness is committed by a Turkish citizen 
in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. 
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a criIBe. 
Article 301 is a not a new concept in Turkey. It was designed to replace Article 159, 
a similar law that was part of the original penal code heavily influenced by Italian Fascism. 
Other Turkish articles dealt with similar issues. In the 1980s when Turkey's Ozal government 
was under international pressure to change Articles 141, 142 and 163 (Articles 141 and 142 
were designed to "fight communism," and Article 163 targeted people with religious 
sensitivities) all were scrapped and Article 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Law was created and used 
in a similar fashion. So, while Article 301 is certainly not the only part of the Turkish Penal 
Code that has fallen under criticism for curtailing freedom of expression and political 
criticism or for its circular purpose of creation (i .e., Articles 318, 305, 216, and 7), it was 
under the wording of Article 301 that the latest surge of charges against intellectuals and 
journalists was carried out. 
High Profile Cases 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an has stated that the European Union was 
consulted during the creation of Article 301 and had no reservations at that time.! 
Questions and concerns were raised only after the article was used to prosecute some 
"Armenian personalities" and Turkish Nationals for comments regarding the Armenian 
Genocide many say took place while the Ottoman Empire was collapsing after World War 
I. 
HRANT DINK 
Indeed, one of the first high profile cases of "insulting Turkishness" was against Hrant 
Dink, editor of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, who asserted that the 
dramatic increase in the application of Article 301 had more to do with "Armenianness" 
than "Turkishness". Dink was charged under Article 301 based on an article in his 
newspaper regarding relations between Armenians and Turks. The court asserted that the 
article contained a phrase implying that Turkish blood was" dirty". One argument is that 
Dink's comment was confusing due to his poor Turkish. A translation of his statement reads, 
'.' poison in the Armenian blood related to the fear and hatred of Turks" by which Dink 
apparently meant that the "fear and hatred" ofTurks is a poison in Arrnenian blood; however, 
due to the wording many interpreted his words as saying that Turkish blood itself was 
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poison. Dink himself flatly denied any wrongdoing and repeatedly insisted that the article 
was intended to improve relations between the two groups. Dink was found guilty and 
sentenced to six months in prison , despite the Prosecutor General's Office objections based 
on the fourth clause2 The guilty verdict was passed seven to two. In their dissent, the two 
judges (one of which was the chairman) expressed concern that the verdict reflected a poor 
understanding of the norms of the EU regJrding the right to criticize and boldly stated , 
"There is still fear for expressing tho ught of dissent in Turkey. No opinion, which has been 
tried and sellt to jail dies. On the contrary. such opinion finds other suppo rters. One should 
know that dissent can not be prevented by creating fear for punishment."3 
Hrant Dink was shot three times in the head on the morning ofJanuary 19, 2006, not 
far fi'0l1l the offices of Agos. The gunman, a troubled young man not yet twenty, is said to 
have yelled, " I shot the non-Muslim'" and then £led the scene. H e was later apprehended. 
Thousands of people m arched in Istanbul in protest of his death, some calling Dink a martyr 
to the cause of the abolishment of Article 301. Turkish offi cials and international dignitaries 
alike have expressed deep sorrow tor Dink's death. 
RAGIP ZARAKOLU 
Around the same time that Dink was brought up on charges, publisher Ragip 
Zarakolu was charged under Article 301 for publishing two books, one referring to the mass 
deportations of Armenians in 1915 carrying a seven and a half year sentence and another 
entitled A n A numiall Doctor ill Turkey carrying a six yea r sentence Zarakolu has yet to stand 
trial for. 
PERIHAN MAG DEN 
A D ecember 2005 newspaper colurnn by Perihan Magden is the basis for another 
high- profile case. The writer and journalist faced a three year prison sentence fo r the article 
which strongly defends the idea of conscientious objection and the refusal to perform 
military service. Conscientious objection is illegal in Turkey and is punishable by 
imprisolUllent, as is any other avoidance of conscription. Magden was acquitted on June 27 , 
2006 when the court ruled that the opinions expressed in the article were covered by 
freedom of expression and therefore not a crime. 
ORHAN PAMUK 
In February of 2005 Article 301 vaulted into the international consciousness when, 
during an interview with the Swiss publication Das Magaz in , Turkey's renowned author 
Orhan Pal11uk stated, "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these 
lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it."The backlash that followed forced Pamuk 
to £lee the country. D emonstrations were staged and his books were burned. C harges were 
brought against hirn upon his return to Turkey later in 2005 . 
Because Pamuk was charged under an ex post fac to law, approval was required from 
the Ministry of Justice in order to prosecute. That approval never came. OnJanuary 22, 2006 
the ministry declared that it had no authority to open a case against Pamuk under the new 
penal code and thus the charges agJinst Pamuk were dropped. That week the European 
Union begain their review of the Turkish justice system. 
Pamuk 's m ost recent novel, Snow, addresses the urgent issues of secularism and religion 
in a country that has been torn between the two for most of the last century. While his 
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comments to a Swedish newspaper unleashed a slew of charges and threats of death and 
imprisonment, his acclaimed novel was released without incident. Later, on the BBC's 
Hardtalk , Pamuk indicated that his remarks in Das Magazill were intended to draw attention 
more to the issue of free speech in Turkey than to the massacres themselves. 
The prosecution of critics and dissenters has few apparent advantages for Turkey. 
Indeed, each charge compounded by the dissenting voices within the govenU11ent itself. In 
Dink's case, the Prosecutor General's Office pointed out that the fourth clause makes it clear 
that criticism is not a crillle, to no avail. Ragip Zarakolu 's case drags on in the courts, 
postponement after postponem ent, serving only to highlight Turkish dissent and bringing 
into question Turkey's EU compatibility. Perihan Magden faced a harsh three year sentence 
for an article that was later declared by the courts to be simply a matter of freedom of 
speech . With Pamuk, the Justice Ministry eventually decla red that they had no authority to 
try him based on Article 301. At the height of m edia scrutiny was the case of Elif Safak, 
when the Turkish government deem ed necessary prosecution over the remarks of fictional 
characters. 
ELiF SAFAK 
Safak, as with Pallluk. had the charges against her driven forward by "ultra-nationalist" 
lawyers, indicating that while the apparent campaign to protect "Turkishness" is not one 
initiated by the conservative AKP government it is , however, clearly not an issue that the 
dominant party would rather address. In September 2006 the then heavily pregnant Safak 
stood trial for only a few minutes before her case was thrown out. In an October 2006 
interview on NPR's A ll Thillgs Considered, Safak gave her view that the real target of her trial 
was not herself but instead Turkey's European Unio n accession bid . The novel , The Bastard 
C?f Istallbul, became a bestseller in its Turkish release. 
Public Reaction 
As evidenced above, several of the charges filed under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal 
Code quickly became high profile m edia frenzies. In Turkey, Ultra-nationalists were riled by 
the controversial statements of those on trial. More liberal fa ctions (mainly pro-EU) were 
outraged by Turkey's willingness to try the cases. Of the latter, there are many who believe, 
both within Turkey and internationally, that the charges brought forth under Article 301 
were not filed in order to protect "Turkishness" or even to stifle dissenting opinions but 
instead to serve the purposes of the ultra-conservative "old-guard" who have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo and keeping Turkey out of the European Union.4 
In other cases it seems that politicians view Article 301 as a non-issue ; that is, 
som ething that is not necessary to gain power and som ething that has many apparent 
disadvantages to address. M ost government officials attempt to downplay the effects of 
Article 301, the main defense being that no one has ever been imprisoned under Article 
301. "Now we can say 'no' - but there is someone who was shot and who died," M ehmet 
Tezkan wrote in Vatan newspaper. "Then [the ministers] will be silenced."5 
While Hrant Dink 's death was directly perpetrated by an angry youth, the youth was 
apparently recruited by Yasin Hayal, a man with an ultra- nationalist agenda who had served 
eleven years for the bombing of a M cDonald's. Another man, a student involved with 
Alperen organization (a neo-facist group associated with the ultra-nationalist Grand Unity 
Party [BBP]) , was also apprehended and charged with instigating and organizing the murder. 
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The BBP denies any involvement in the killing. All three m en lived in Trabzon, a city known 
for ultra-nationalist recruitment. Were these men the link , the conductors between a 
culturally embedded wariness o f free speech and an ultra-nationalist sector of the public 
galvanized against the EU and its implications? And did Dink, a man who shortly before his 
death wrote in Agos that "The memory of my computer is filled with angry, threatening 
lines . . . "6 become a lightening rod for that fury? For many in Turkey, Dink is considered a 
hero. The hate mail flowin g into his inbox is a stark indica tion of the division Turkey has 
t~l ced for decades. On one side, ultra- nationalists seethe at the perceived European yoke. O n 
the o ther, those who support the EU bid race to grow and change Turkey with ever 
lI1creasll1g urgency. 
Erkan Mumcu, leader of the Motherland Party, indicated his belief that, "Certain 
circles try to create a Turkish profile of attacking innocent doves."7 He called the killing a 
plot to create a fundam entalist Turkish image. H e did not distinctly specifY who was behind 
the plot tarnish Turkey's image, but he did reference a rem ark made by Dink inte rring that 
E uropeans were the real reason for the fi:iction between Turks and Armenians in addition to 
alleging nepotism and corruption within the Turkish government. 
In the wake of Dink 's death the death threats seemed to have passed on to Pamuk. 
While being escorted in a courtroom, Yasin Hayal sho uted out for Pamuk to "be smart" , 
implying that ifPamuk was not carefi.II he could suffer the sam e fate as Dink. Pamuk is now 
also getting a lot of ultra-nationalist hate mail similar to mail received by Dink. As a 
precaution, Pamuk is now under close protection (protection that Dink was refused). 
Public reaction to the murder has been tremendous. While Dink 's murder is certainly 
a blow to the outlook of free speech in Turkey, it has also inspired many to exercise free 
speech to its fullest. Aside from the tho usands upo n tho usands of demonstrators that walk 
in Dink's funeral processio n holding signs in Kurdish , Turkish and Armenian that read " We 
are all Armenian . We are all Hrant Dink", there were also those holding "301 is the 
m~ll·de rer" placards. Mainstream newspapers all over Turkey are united in their outrage at 
Dink's murder and their condernnation for Article 301. The public pressure to do away with 
Article 301 is rising. But so is the ultra- nationalist pressure. 
A301 & EU Accession 
Many Turks view EU accession as a lost cause, irrelevant, and are more concerned that 
the EU will ban their favorite fast food chain than with education , social security, health 
issues, etc. Some of Turkey's populous feels that the EU is treating Turkey unfairly, forcing 
them to jump through hoops they wo uld not otherwise have to jump through if they were 
not a Muslim nation, if they were not Turkey. There is strong concern about a European 
C hristian bias towards Turkey, some even saying "Christian Values" is the new accession 
criteria, especially after the September 22, 2006 conunents of Bavarian President Edmund 
Stoiber (leader of the Christian Social Union Party [SU], which has strong ties with 
Germany's ruling Christian Democratic Union). Stoiber proposed that deliberations on 
Turkey's accession be ended , citing what he thought to be gross overreaction of Turkish 
leaders to Pope Benedict's conunents on Islam. He is also qu oted as saying, "Turkey is not 
Europe nor does it belong to the continent, because the country has such great cultural and 
spiritual differences with western values."8 It has been alleged that Germany's government 
shares this view but cannot come out in support of it due to diplomatic constraints. 
In response, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedat Laciner, head of the Ankara-based USAK m ade 
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some scathing remarks. "If the EU is only a Christian club, I think Turkey should not be part 
of it. Because Turkey is a secular country and I am personally against to be part of a Middle 
Ages understanding." Laciner goes on to call "Christianity-based Europe" a "narrow-
minded organization", and warns that Turkey should stay away from the "discriminative 
structure and religious fundamentalism" of Europe. He also compared Mr. Stoiber to Osama 
Bin Laden in "seeding religious hate" and compared Turkey's current position with that of 
European Jews before World War II. "We want to see a more just and more balanced EU," 
Mr. Laciner added. "We want to establish a common future instead of obsessing with the 
biases of the past."9 
Turks grow restless at the strain of change and the insistence that, when change 
occurs. it is not enough. They feel that enough is enough, that there is no hope for accession. 
These are the sentiments that are feeding the ultra- national surge in Turkey. 1 0 
The conservative Muslim AK party has struggled to bring Turkey closer to EU 
accession. In the interest compliance with the Copenhangen political criteria the 1982 
Turkish constitution underwent extensive amendment in October 2001 and May 2004 with 
eight " harmonization packages" passing the Turkish Parliament in the interim. Article 90 of 
the Turkish constitution was amended per EU recommendations in order to establish the 
supremacy of international human rights conventions over domestic law. The civilian 
control over the military was irnproved during this time as well , putting the budget back in 
the hands of parliament and allowed closer scrutiny of the Turkish Armed Forces. Spending 
for education was increased and now exceeds military spending. Many other reforms 
involving the openness of government procedures and the strengthening of civilian control 
have also been enacted. 
A301 Supporters 
The AKP's main opposition, the Kemalist CHp, is against further EU reforms. Their 
attitude is made it clear in a statem ent by their deputy Orhan Eraslan, mem.ber of the justice 
conunission of Turkish parliament: "301 is not wrong. It should not change. It is not only a 
need, it is also a necessity. If we want to remain as a nation and state, it should remain."l l 
In addition, Republican People's Party (CHP) leader D eniz Baykal said, "The prime 
minister is looking for an accomplice to the shameful act of making it free to insult the 
Turkish identity in Turkey. H e almost expects us to apologize for being Turkish. We will not 
apologize." 12 
The Nationalist Movement Party's (MHP) support of Article 301 has not waivered 
either. Mehmet Nacar, vice secretary-general of the MHP, has asserted that criticisms of 
Article 301 intentionally disregard the fourth clause ("Expressions of thought intended to 
criticize shall not constitute a crime.") which Nacar claims is an indication of a hidden 
agenda to destory Article 301 in order to degrade Turkishness with impunity. 
Sinan Aygiin, president of the Ankara Chamber of Conmlerce, is not only a supporter 
of Article 301 but has called for a harsher version . Aygun reviewed the article with a group 
of experts and presented a report to Minister of Justice Cemil <;:ic;:ek saying just that. 
<;:ic;:ek, the architect of Article 301, has been harshly criticized by the media . Many 
believe that <;:ic;:ek is blocking any move to reform Article 301. In his own defense or 
perhaps the article 's, <;:ic;:ek has responded that the many critics of Article 301 have failed to 
read its text. "These people do not know the previous law and the changes in it. They do 
not realize what kind of implications a change in this article will provoke in this country," 
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<;::i<;:ek said.13 <;:: i<;:ek also said that the text of the law is not so important as how the 
prosecutors use it or how the judges interpret it. He claims that even if Article 301 was 
abolished, if prosecutors or judges had "bad intentions" they could simply substitute Article 
216 and continue unabated. 
Minister of Tourism Atilla Ko<;:, while in supportive of Article 301 , does not believe 
that the problem of Article 301's vauge text is entirely relevent and that the real issue lies in 
the rnethod of jurispridence. 
Prime Minister Erdo an is not comfortable with the idea of abolishing Article 301 
altogether, nor is he comfortable with the connection of Article 301 to Hrant D ink's 
murder. H e has asserted that only change in the article could be the increased penalty in the 
third clause for a Turkish citizen insulting Turkishness in another country. 
A301 Reform 
At this time a joint proposal for the amendment of Article 301 has been submitted to 
the Turkish gove rmnent. It has already met with great criticism ; some say it is more of a 
retreat to Article 159 than an improvement, including Ruling Justice and D evelopment 
(AK) Party deputy leader Dengir Mir M ehmet Firat who called the proposal a " throwback" 
in terms of mentali ty. 14 Economic Development Foundation (IKV) head D avut Okutcu, 
spokesperson for the group, denies this accusation. T he proposal retained the notion of 
"Turkishness" but replaced "insulting" with "derision or 'hurling invective"'. It also included 
reduced penalties for the offense and puts special emphasis on the verdicts of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and defines "Turkishness" under Article 66 of the 
Constitution, which defines "Turkishness" as people who are tied to the Turkish R epublic 
with a bond of citizenship are called Turks. 15 The proposal is mainly criticized for its fa ilure 
to bring clear legal definition to an infamously manipulated article. 
The proposal was prepared by IKV, Turkish Union of Chambers and ConmlOdities 
Exchanges (TOBB) , Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) , 
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD) , Turkish Confederation 
of Employers' Unions (TISK) , Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is), Labor 
Confederation (Hak-Is), Civil Servant Unions Confederation (Memur-Sen), Turkish 
Broadcasters Association (TVYD) and Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers (TZOB). 
Of the twelve participants, the R evolutionary Workers' Labor Union (DISK) and the 
Turkish D octors Union (TTB) disapproved of the outcome, saying that the law should be 
struck down altogether. Justice Minister Cemil C icek himself was critical of the proposal , 
accusing those involved of overlooking his call to work on a concrete proposal. 
In response to the proposal, Turkish Solidarity Council Spokesperson Mustafa Erkal , 
held a joint press conference in support of the current article. The Turkish Solidarity 
Council is made of nearly 100 civil groups invested in the preservation of Article 301. 
Others expressed outrage that supporters of the article are being depicted as having 
encouraged the murder of Hrant Dink and accused the European Union of having double 
standards, referen cing similar laws on European books. Ankara C hamber of C Onll11erCe 
(ATO) Chair Sinan Aygun pointed out that the article protects those who want to annul it. 
Largely ignored by the Turkish and the international press alike is the issue of the 
fourth clause of Article 301. The fourth clause is utilized almost arbitrarily and while it 
should have a serious impact of the interpretation of the law, judges, prosecutors and the 
press often ignore it in their discussions. Obviously, those in support of Article 301 most 
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conmlOnly mention it, but they too do not spend too much time analyzing the benign 
clause. The fact that within the controversial Article there is a clause protecting "expressions 
of thought intended to criticize" should be a good indication of Turkey's progress but in 
practice in ends up as a red herring. 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Article 301 is definitely of great concern to the EU with regards to Turkey's accession. 
A report issued fi'om the Commission to the European Parliament and Council in regards 
to the enlargement process announces that, "It is necessary to ensure freedom of expression 
without delay by repealing or amending Article 301 of the Penal Code and by overall 
bringing the legislation into line with European standards."16 Article 301 is seen to be in 
violatio n of the Copenhagen Criteria, mainly regarding " human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities". 
The EU trusts Turkey to solve its internal free speech issues. Beyond the amendment 
or repealing of Article 301, there is not much in the progression of free speech in Turkey 
that the EU feels it can (or indeed, is required to) effect. 
Similar EU Laws 
There is criticism of the EU within Turkey regarding their strong stance against 
Article 301. EU critics and supporters of the article point out that rnany European 
Countries have similar laws. For example, German articles 90, 90a and 90b penalize sti ch 
acts as insulting or malicio usly maligning Germany or one of its lands or constitutional 
order, disparagement of Germany's colors, fla g, coat of arms or anthem and anti-
constitutional disparagem ent of it's constitutional organs. Punishments for the German 
articles are harsher than in Article 301 and as of the middJe of 2006, there were 72 sentences 
resulting from these articles. 
Italy has 290,291 and 292 of the Italian Penal Code regards degradation , insulting and 
disparagement of the republic, constitutional institutions, military forces, flag and other state 
symbols and the Italian nation as punishable crimes. There were 21 convictions in 2000,31 
in 2001,22 in 2002, five in 2003 and 28 in 2004. 
A total of 134 " criminals of degradation" were convicted under the Dutch Penal 
Code in 2004,146 in 2005 and 139 in 2006 of crimes similar to those described in Article 
301. The Polish, Spanish, French and Austrian penal codes have similar articles. The Danish 
Penal Code includes EU nations, countries and the EU Parliament into the list of legally 
"indemnified" entities. 17 
However, European concerns stems mainly from the application of the law. Prime 
Minister Erdo an himself has noted that the European Union did not disapprove of the 
creation of Article 301. Only after Article 301 was so prolifically applied did the EU raise 
any objections. Also, it should be noted that while Turkey treats Article 301 as a criminal 
offense, most of the articles described above are treated as civil offenses. 
Calls For Change 
European Parliament member Joost Lagendijk sent a letter to both Prime Minister 
Erdo an and main opposition leader D eniz Baykal asking them to inunediately change 
Article 301. Within the letter Lagendijk allowed that many EU countries, including his own 
country, the Netherlands, had laws similar to Article 301. H owever, he also pointed out the 
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differences in these laws. "First there is the word 'Turkishness' in the first paragraph of Article 
301. .. . T he second point concerns the reasoning behind the article . ... It should serve the 
orderly functioning of the public service," explained Lagendijk.1 8 N o ne of the high-profile 
Turkish cases, he went on, served this function . 
C hiefEU negotiator Ali Babacan asserts that Article 301 is not really the problem but 
instead an element of the Turkish m entality that allows laws such as Article 301 to be used 
in a negative fashio n . " Lifting or changing Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code will not 
change a great deal so long as the players concerned do not change their menta lity. They 
will simply find other articles of the Turkish Penal Code to put to use in the same way." 
Babacan added, "We are attempting to realize a new philosophy with old players. T lus simply 
will not work." 19 
Progress Reports 
A report issued o n O ctober 5, 2003 by Arie Oostlander, C hristian Democrati c MP to 
the European Parliam ent regarding Turkey's progress towards meeting the Copenhagen 
Criteria (offi cially called "2003 R egula r R epo rt on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession") 
recognized and cataloged Turkey's progress as well as addressed issues that still required 
further reform (or in some cases, any refo rm at all). 
T he report focused on the political system , the judiciary, the role of the nulitary, the 
status of religious nl.inoriti es and their property rights as well as Turkey's non-compliance 
with several decisio ns of the European Court of Human Rights. Among some of the major 
concerns of the report were regarding Turkey's "authoritarian philosoplues". Much of the 
Turkish Penal C ode refl ects the influence of Italian Fascism of the 1930s and of particular 
concern in the report was the 1982 Turkish constitution which gives the National Security 
C ouncil (NSC) a wide breadth of powers incompatible with a civilian democracy. The 
report cites NSC's role in the C ouncil of Higher Education (YOK) and the Council of 
R adio and Television (RTUK) among others extensions of military powers into civilian life 
without sufficient oversight that must be limited (the report also cites various amendments 
from previous "refo rm packages" that w orked towards this goal, such as abolishing extended 
powers of the N SC, linuting access to civilian agencies and increased fiscal transparency) . 
Also emphasized was the need for Turkey to transfer power from NSC donunated 
organizations to civil society associations and encouragement of social dialogue and trade 
Ul11ons. 
Mr. Oostlander's report raised concerns rega rding Article 27 of the C ovenant of C ivil 
and Political Rights (granting ethluc, religious, and linguistic m inorities the right to pursue 
their culture, religio n and language). Agreement to such an article is controversial in Turkey 
largely due to the roughly 15 million Kurds living in the country. Turkey also has laws 
restricting certain property rights and religious trailung of Catholic and Protestant churches. 
R egarding the Turkish Penal C ode, Articles 312, 169 and 7 (dealing with provocation 
and threats to "public security" resulting from the advocacy of class, ethluc, religious, 
linguistic, and facial divisions) were singled out as being used to intimidate, prosecute and 
condemn many Turkish intellectuals and politicians to prison sentences. C oncerns regarding 
the impartiality and consistency of judges as well as the lack of proper oversight of prison 
administrators (and therefore a lack of proper evaluatio n of complaints regarding the 
treatment of prisoners) were also presented in the report. 
T he report m entions that Article 159 (Article 301's predecessor, " insulting the state 
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and state institutions and threats to the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic") had been 
reformed in 2002, reducing the minimum sentence from on year to six months and 
including exceptions for expressions of opinion intended only to criticize, and not intended 
to "insult" and "deride" these institutions. However, it also warns that: 
... as announced by the Turkish government, the process of reviewing existing 
legal restrictions in this area has yet to be completed. In a report assessing the 3 
November 2002 elections, the OSCEIODIHR concluded that the broader 
legal framework and its implementation establish strict limits on the scope of 
political debate in Turkey. Non-violent expression of political views beyond 
these limits is still restricted by a variety oflaws and is rigorously enforced.2o 
The report goes on to explain how Turkish prosecutors have a tendency to use 
alternative provisions of the Penal Code (Articles 312 and 1(9) and the Anti-Terror Law 
(Article 7) to limit freedom of expression, hinder the freedom of the press (confiscation of 
press equipment, heavy fines on publishers and internet censorship) as well as to prosecute 
those who had been acquitted based on the reforms. The report calls for a more consistent 
and systematic approach to address these issues and all future amended legislation. 
The report also leaves no question that Article 90 must be altered to establish the 
primacy of international law over national law, a critical step to becoming part of the 
European Union. Mr. Oostlander made it clear in his report that Turkey had work to do 
before it would meet the Copenhagen Criteria, but clearly stated that "Turkey is able, if it 
wishes and if it considers it to be in its interest, to transform itself into a first-class EU state." 
In its "Presidency Conclusions" on December 16 and 17, 2004, the European Council 
praised Turkey for its progress and stated that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the 
Copenhagen political criteria enough to open accession negotiations provided it adhered to 
the recommended reforms. The "Conclusions" made no specific mention of Article 159 (or 
Article 301, as it did not yet exist). 
A report issued November 8, 2006 by Olli Rehn echoed these same concerns, 
indicating that progress in Turkey has been slow. The outlook of the report was on the 
positive side. In regards to Article 301, Rehn said: 
We state clearly in our report that further reforms are needed, in particular to 
ensure the freedom of expression. There is an open and intense debate going on 
in the Turkish civil society on the notorious article 301, calling for its 
amendment. Prime Minister Erdogan has invited civil society organisations to 
propose amendments to the Penal Code, which is a welcome initiative. We 
expect words to lead to deeds, soon. 21 
Also in the report Rehn indicates that the best way to deal with Turkey is to be "firm 
but fair". This is a subtle indication that the EU has no intention of budging on their 
requirements, no do they have any inclination to let Turkey into the European Union (at 
least not any time soon). 
CONCLUSION 
To date, Turkey has failed to initiate all of the reforms advised by the Oostlander 
Report, most notably the drafting of a new "civilian constitution" (as opposed to Turkey's 
current "authoritarian" constitution, established in 1982 after a military coup). Reforms 
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have been made, such as extensive constitutional amendments geared at meeting the 
Copenhagen Criteria and the establishment of the supremacy of international human rights 
conventions over domesti c law. However, severe authoritarian elements remain, threatening 
free speech in its Turkish infancy. The turbulence of the past century and influence of 
authoritarian and fascist have long mired Turkey in an ideology of safety over freedoms, 
exemplified in Orhan Eraslan remarks on Article 301. 
The AK party has long been a staunch supporter of reform, striving to m eet the 
requirements of the EU and to elevate their country to the global scale. Why then would 
that same government allow such high-profile campaign against free speech? After all the 
hard work they've done, after all the progress they've made, why block the path they 
themselves laid? The AKP's current diplomatic/political stance on Article 301 is wait-and-
see. It is clear, though, that as Turkey nea rs election time, politicians are less and less inclined 
to address the issue. As described in the above pages, Turkey is divided on a gradient line 
between freedom of expression, nationalism , Europe, integration and the shards of the 
Ottoman Empire left behind. The polarization in Turkey is palpable, in a country where 
instability has been a persistent bedfellow, so after so many years of political turmoil and 
military coups it is understandable why so many would be willing to risk it - even at the 
cost of personal freedoms. The nationalist movement constantly chall enges the governm ent 
to curtail free speech and go against the European Union 's criteria just as the pro-EU 
fa cti o ns demand that m ore progress be made towards accession. 
It is clear that the nationalist movement is the driving force behind Article 301 and 
its counterparts. Who or what faction serves to gain ti'om hindering Turkey's efforts to 
accommodate the EU's requirements? There is a m entality in Turkey (not necessarily shared 
by all Turks, but largely prevalent) of hard-won national pride. Anyone serving to diminish 
that pride is not only insulting Turkey but any individual who is proud to call themselves a 
T~lrk . Ultra-nationalist factions use this sentiment to gain a stronger grip on society and 
attempt to pull Turkey into a reactionary landslide. It is not so much that Turks do not 
understand free speech as the ultra-nationalists do not trust it and see it as a tool of "enemies 
of the state"; Turkey's prevailing govenunent, on the other hand, either cannot or does not 
know how to balance their desire to become a national economy with a respected presence 
in the EU with the extremely powelful ultra-nationalist factions that seek to thwart it. 
Turkey may be somewhat behind on the accession requirements of the European Union but 
it would be a poor assessment to underestimate them. The Turkish are cognizant of free 
speech, they just don 't have much experience with what it can do. Fear of the unknown 
coupled with the m emory of disastrous political instability create a situation where 
explo ring the param eters and ramifications of free speech ca use public outcry and 
reactionary elements to surface. In Turkey, a country who not long ago was ruled by 
emperors and dictators, freedom of speech will be a slow and painful process. It is clear that 
there is a drive within Turkey to join its Western neighbors and break free of the stigmas of 
the Middle East, but there are too few who want this at the cost of becoming Western . It is 
a tangled struggle through which Turkey must emerge whole if it ever hopes to achieve 
accession. But how Western can Turkey become before they split apart? 
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